

# Watching the Watchers: Automatically Inferring TV Content From Outdoor Light Effusions



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# Introduction + Why Should You Care?

Exploit emanations of changes in light to reveal TV content

Can be done from 70+ meters away

Privacy concerns

- ❖ Religious beliefs, political views, private things
- ❖ U.S. Video Privacy Act of 1998
- ❖ 67% of people watch TV during dinner

# Related Work

Power usage + power line electromagnetic interference


- ❖ Depends on TV model / structure of power system

Shiny object reflections

- ❖ Recover static image
- ❖ Require a view of the screen

# Overview

Can we infer content based on brightness changes in a room?



# Sugar, Spice, and Everything Nice

What we care about to pull this off

- ❖ Quality of captured information (SNR)
- ❖ Entropy of observed information
- ❖ Length of captured signal
- ❖ Size + uniqueness of reference library

# Methodology - Feature Extraction

- ❖ Compute average pixel brightness for each frame
- ❖ Gradient of average brightness signal is what we care about
  - 95% of consecutive frames have the same average intensity
- ❖ Feature vector = composition of peaks

Also do this for every video in the database

# Methodology - Finding the Best Match

Nearest neighbor search across subsequences

Similarity metric for correlation between two signals

- ❖ Assumes the same starting point of both signals
- ❖ Computationally hard to exhaustively search
- ❖ Takes around 188 seconds to locate a video from 54,000 videos

# Methodology - Finding the Best Match

- ❖ Sliding window of length 512 over the gradient feature
  - ❖ Omit all peaks below 30% of the strongest peak's magnitude
  - ❖ Compute histogram of pairwise distance between peaks
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- ❖ Index peak features in a K-d tree
  - ❖ “Found” when best match is stable for 3 iterations
  - ❖ Search time goes down to 10 seconds



# Reference Library

- ❖ 10,000 movies
- ❖ 24,000 news clips
- ❖ 10,000 music videos
- ❖ 10,000 TV shows

Over 18,800 hours of video

Extract feature vectors for all of these

# Experimental Setup

Record the reflection of TV from a white wall

Distance of 3 meters

Randomly select 62 sequences from the library

Capture with

- ❖ Logitech HD Pro Webcam C920
- ❖ 60D Canon DSLR

# Standard test

Lights off

24 inch screen

Random starting point

Capture Length	60s	90s	120s	180s	240s	270s
Success Rate	39%	49%	54%	70%	85%	94 %

# Impact of Room Brightness

Capture 5 videos in 3 different settings

Illumination settings	SNR	Segment Length
Normal brightness level room light off	70	180s
50% brightness level room light off	33	270s
Normal brightness level room light on	15	300s

# Impact of Screen Size

Screen Size	SNR	Worst Case Length
24 inch	5	270s
30 inch	48	180s
50 inch	109	180s

# Other Factors + Tests

## Library Size

- ❖ Vary size from 4,000 to 54,000 videos ( x 13.5)
- ❖ Worst case length from 200s to 240s ( x 1.2)

## Outdoors

- ❖ Attacker positioned on sidewalk
- ❖ Observing 3rd floor office window

# Outdoors - Results

Various distance tests

Average worst case

- ❖ 100 seconds at 13.5m
- ❖ 190 seconds at 70.9m




Aerial View



Scenario

Capture Length with Different Distance



# Mitigations

## Curtains

- ❖ Vinyl: 3/4 videos after 270 seconds
- ❖ Black: 0/4 videos

## Lower screen brightness

## Flood light

- ❖ Blinds camera but doesn't thwart HDR

## Adaptive lighting system



# Discussion

What are the key contributions of this paper?

What are the limitations of this approach/Is this attack practical?

How much do people actually care about being targeted by this?