(sp)iPhone: Decoding Vibrations From Nearby Keyboards Using Mobile Phone Accelerometers

Philip Marquardt et al.

ACM Computer and Communications Security 2011

y Ren-Jay Wang

n old kind of attack

ow do we fix this problem?

Easy solution: users provide explicit permission

new kind of attack

We can use mobile phone accelerometers to detect vibrations







elated electrical/mechanical manation attacks

- Van Eck Phreaking (CRT electromagnetic emanations)
- Tempest in a teapot: Compromising Reflections Revisited
- Recreating key presses through a microphone

he new attack

Many users place their phones nearby when working on a computer

We can use this fact to our advantage to eavesdrop



he result of trying old techniques

We choose to use an iPhone 4 because it has a better accelerometer & gyroscope





…doesn't work

o what do we do next?

We choose to recognize key *pairs* instead of individual keys

We recognize whether keys are on the LEFT or RIGHT relative to a central line and if they are NEAR or FAR relative to some defined threshold distance α

For example, “Canoe” ->

LLN LRF RRF RLF

Strings of length *n* can be split into *n-1* abstract string representations

reating our own neural network model
tep 1: Learning phase

Record each key press 150 times (total 3900 key-press events)

Create feature vector for each key drawing from x,y,z accelerations => <mean, kurtosis, variance, min, max, energy, rms, mfccs, ftts>

Word labeling: for each *n-1* character pairs, concatenate random feature vectors for the corresponding keys

Can't be too specific -> to avoid overtraining, use even distribution of left, right, near and far labels

reating our own neural network model
tep 2: Attack phase

Data Collection: Raw-acceleration data is collected

Feature Extraction: Feature-vectors are calculated

Key-press Classification: L/R labels and N/F labels are classified based on the neural networks

Word Matching: Words are matched against a dictionary and sorted; top scores are candidate predictions



ow well does our model perform?

L/R classifier correctly identifies 91% of the time

N/F classifier correctly identifies 65% of the time

These percentages drop with more keypresses, which is to be expected

xperimental Results – Tests 1 and 2

- Removed words of <= 3 characters
- Test 1: 1 sentence -> 80% accuracy using first choice
- Test 2: 10 sentences -> 46% using first choice, 73% within first two choices

1st Choice Correct = 80%
L/R Accuracy = 91.07%
N/F Accuracy = 70.15%

Typed Text: The birch canoe slid on the smooth planks
Recovered Text: *** punch canoe slid ** *** smooth planks

<- Test 1

Test 2 ->

1st or 2nd Choice Correct = 72.92%
L/R Accuracy =83.95%
N/F Accuracy = 64.88%

Typed Text: Glue the sheet to the dark blue backgro
Recovered Text: Glue *** sheet ** *** well hogs backgro
blue

Typed Text: These days a chicken leg is a rare dish
Recovered Text: These days * chicken *** ** * rare dish

xperimental Results – Test 3

Comparison to previous work by Berger et al., using dictionary of 57,500 words and sentence with 4-9 characters per word

Berger: 43% accuracy within top 10 word guesses

Experimental result: 43% as well!

Experimental results less accurate than Berger when increasing the number of guesses…limitations?



xperimental Results – Test 4

- A more realistic attack – USAToday article
- Dictionary constructed using seven related news articles
- 40% in first choice, 53% in top 2, and 80% accuracy in top 5 predictions

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1-5 Choice Correct = 80.00%
L/R Accuracy =78.58%
N/F Accuracy = 61.09%

Typed Text: The Illinois Supreme Court has ruled that Rahm Emanuel is eligible to

          run for mayor of Chicago and ordered him to stay on the ballot

Recovered Text:  ***  Illinois Supreme about *** ruled part wait Emanuel ** chicagos **
                              among                  Rahm            eligible
                              might
                              night
                              Court
                 *** *** names ** Chicago  *** printed *** ** look ** *** ballot
                                              members
                                              grinned
                                              ordered
```

hallenges and Limitations

Distance and environmental factors – only sure to work within one foot

Orientation of the phone

Ambient vibration

Typing speed

Desk surface

ow do we fix this vulnerability

Short term solutions

- Don’t get too close!
- Permissions on accelerometer

Long term solutions

- Restricting data resolution to applications
- Being careful with all kinds of sensors in the future!

iscussion Points

Key contributions of the paper?

Limitations to this attack?

Is this paper relevant to other areas of security?

Thoughts on improving the accuracy/effectiveness of the attack?

What are ways we can combat these kinds of attacks?